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If economists agree on one thing, it is the law of demand:
if the price of a good increases, demand will decrease, all
other things held constant.  This simple, but powerful
observation is at the heart of using prices to manage urban
water demands: as the price of water increases, the
demand should  decrease.  In short, pricing can be a useful
tool in efforts to conserve water.  Yet studies on the price
responsiveness of water demand have produced  various
results.  While price elasticities of demand for water have
usually been found to be very inelastic, some studies have
suggested much more elastic demands, depending on
season or region of the county.  When price is included in
a demand model, it postulates a relationship between how
much water a consumer uses and the price they pay for
water.  The economic question is, which price variable
should be included  in the model?   Put another way, which
price is the one that consumers use to judge how much
water to buy? 
Economic theory is clear that marginal price should be
used since consumers, in achieving equilibrium, equate
benefits with the cost at the margin (Taylor, 1975).  The
marginal price is the price for another unit.  Howe (1993)
states that the correct definition of price should  be “... the
amount paid per unit of water withdrawn from the supply
system for the next (or marginal) unit withdrawn.” Howe
calls this a behaviorally relevant measure of the cost
incurred by the water user in using one more unit
(emphasis in original).  It is the cost, says Howe, that a
rational user will compare with marginal benefits in
deciding how much water to apply.  However rational,
marginal price information is rarely available to water
customers at decision time.  If a person goes to a store to
buy a product, the marginal price is clear.  For water, what
is the marginal price and do consumers have the
information to determine the price at the margin?  Usually,
the block in the rate structure where the consumer’s water
use  is observed represents the marginal price (Howe,
1982).  For example, in a rate structure that charges $1.50
per thousand for the first 3,000 gallons and $2.00 per
thousand for use between 3,000 and 10,000 gallons, the
marginal price for a customer using 8,000 gallons is $2.00.
However, studies have shown that people are not aware of
the marginal price of water (Nieswiadomy and Molina,
1991).
While many studies say marginal price should  be used in
any demand estimation when block prices exit, Foster and
Beattie (1981) believe that the perfect-knowledge
postulate implicit in marginal price models does not apply
to water.  They believe that average price is the motivating
price for consumer response.  Foster and Beattie
concluded that, given billing procedures and the high cost
for consumers to gain and act on information about actual
water rates, the use of marginal price models does not
reflect consumer actions.  Few people would gather
information necessary to apply a marginal cost decision
model.  
WATER  PRICES
However, even the use of average price may fall victim to
the same knowledge constraints as noticed by Foster and
Beattie.  When a person goes to a store to buy a good, the
choice is discrete --- do they buy another unit or no t (table
1)?  Consumers know the marginal price since it is the
price marked, as is the average price.  The consumer can
decide to buy one, or ten or any known amount and they
make payment before use.  For water, a consumer does not
buy in discrete units like gallons, but in bulk.  The
consumer does not know the marginal price for every use
of water or the amount used at any one time.  Finally,
water bills come after use .  Consumers cannot adjust the
quantity demanded at discrete block boundaries.  Knowing
consumption during the billing period is difficult since a
consumer cannot easily check the meter.
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Table 1.  W ater vs. Other Goods Price Decisions
Other goods Water
Discrete choice Bulk Buying
Known marginal price Do not know marginal price
Known average price Do not know average price
Known amount purchased Do not know amount purchased at time of use
Pay before use Pay after use
Further, water bills often do not carry information needed
to make decisions.  They also often convey so much
unrelated information that sorting it out is difficult.  In a
survey in Tulsa a lack of rate structure knowledge was
evident  (Agthe, et al, 1988).  Only 21 percent of those
surveyed were aware that there was a block rate structure
at all.  To get information on blocks, consumers had  to
contact the utility.  It was found that the complexity of the
structure confused customers and prevented information
acquisition. 
In a 1992 survey in Georgia, 400 people were asked if
they knew how much they paid for water in an average
month.  Of those, 62 percent knew their water bill and
provided an answer that, when checked, approximated
their true water bills.  Another 26 percent did not know
their bills because they included it in rent.  Only 12
percent had no idea of their water bill.  When the same
people were asked if they knew their water rate or rate
structure, only twelve people answered yes and of those,
eight were wrong.  
It is not only water customers that are confused about
rates.  In a 1995 survey, water utility managers in Georgia
were asked to check the rate structure currently used.
Later in the survey, they were asked to show the exact rate
structures using prices per thousand.  When the two
answers were cross-checked, 48 percent of the managers
misidentified the rate structure in use.
Often, the complexity of the bill itself is a hindrance to
information collection.  Figure 1 shows an actual water bill
for a local utility.  This utility shows water charges along
with wastewater, storm water, electric, garbage disposal
and collection and other charges.  The bill arrived March
3 and showed the recipient of this bill that water
consumption for January 1999 was 43 gallons, with
average consumption 1.483 gallons.  What is a consumer
to think about these figures?  Did they consume 43
gallons, or 4,300 gallons as the bill is supposed to convey?
What is the marginal price charged  for the last unit
consumed?  On the other end of the spectrum, Figure 2
shows a water  utility bill with little information.  Here, it
is shown that 7,700 gallons were consumed but
information on rates, structures, or charges is lacking.  
Figure 1.  Example of a Local W ater Utility Bill - 1
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Figure 2.  Example of Local W ater Utility Bill - 2
While what works in models does affect economic
research, consumers clearly do not make water decisions
based on marginal price, average price or some price
differential.  The only information consumers have is their
total water b ill, usually lagged one month.  Of course,
when looking at the b ill in figure 1, how do consumers
react to the “total bill?”  Is it the price of water only, water
plus wastewater, or  all utilities?  In a recent survey of 89
water utilities across the US on experiences using
conservation water rates (Albani and Jordan, 1999) almost
all of the respondents charge for water and wastewater on
the same bill and nearly half have some type of garbage
collection charge.  Gas charges were included on the bills
of 8 percent of the utility respondents, along with electric
(12 percent), cable (2 percent), storm water (31 percent),
and other (20 percent).  With deregulation of gas delivery,
more local governments will be including that charge
along with new telecommunication charges.  Bill
consolidation is presenting customers with larger single
bills with water only one item.  If, as is believed,
customers respond more to  the total amount of the bill
rather than any one item, the use of water pricing alone to
provide conservation incentives may become less
effective.  While bill consolidation is a savings to local
governments, the sacrifice may be in the ability to use
pricing for any one utility item to send conservation
incentives.  Further, while nearly two-thirds of the
surveyed utilities used monthly billing (79 percent non-
residential), non-monthly billing is still significant.  Again,
to use water bills to send conservation-incentive signals
requires timely information to the consumer.  It is
interesting that as more utilities seem to  be using price as
an incentive for conservation, the changes in bill practices
may make such use less effective.
PEAK AND SEASONAL PRICING
While it is uncertain what prices consumers respond to,
and whether they respond to specific rate structures, there
is evidence that peak pricing does give a clear economic
signal and can produce the desired consequences.
Lyman (1992) found peak period price elasticity was more
than twice the off-peak elasticity.  Lyman estimated  peak
elasticity of about -1.35 compared with an inelastic off-
peak elasticity of -0.44.  Thus, peak prices are more elastic
than nonpeak.  Lyman also found cross-price effects
between peak and off-peak periods.  This effect was
similar to an income effect where peak charges affect
water use in the nonpeak period.  For example, peak
charges could  cause people to buy water efficient durable
goods like dishwashers or washing machines that cut off-
peak water use.  With all else constant, Lyman found that
the long-run effect of a variable influencing demand will
be 24.5 percent greater in the peak vs. off-peak period.
Lyman concluded that although the literature on
conservation pricing focuses on block price schemes,
utilities may find it better to consider peak and off-peak
effects.
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Seasonal pricing, a form of peak pricing, is also an
effective method of using marginal cost to price water.
Griffin and Chang (1991) found that summer residential
demand is more  price responsive than winter demand.
Consequently, price can be a more effective allocative tool
in the summer than winter.  Summer price sensitivity can
be as great as 30 percent more than winter price responses.
CONCLUSION
So where does this leave the question of which price? or
which rate structure?  The conclusions drawn from the
survey of experiences from water utilities may help in
using prices to manage urban water demand:
1. It appears that rates, as part of a conservation
program, can best be used  to reduce peak demands.
This suggests that the economic penalty of excess use
or seasonal use can be an effective method of
providing consumers the incentive to reduce peak
water use.  Conservation rates may be less effective  in
reducing “base level” (indoor) water use.
2. This suggests that the use of permanent or complex
increasing rate structures may be less effective than
simple uniform rates with excess or seasonal charges.
Such rates provide consumers with a direct and
apparent economic charge for peak water use.
However, the impact of peak charges on revenues is
unclear and may be less predictable than other rates.
3. Since most systems use other methods to encourage
conservation, these findings suggest that while rates
may be effective in peak usage, other programs (like
low-flow fixtures, education, etc.) can be best targeted
at reducing the base demand.
However the price signal is sent, perhaps as long as
increased water use produces higher water bills, the use of
pricing as a conservation measure is useful.  So, while
price matters, it may be that rate structures do not,
particularly for residential water use.
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